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Abstract
Purpose – This study aims to investigate the influence of budgeting design characteristics on perceived
budgeting usefulness, based on the enabling-coercive framework.
Design/methodology/approach – This paper develops a survey in one large publicly-listed Brazilian
company that operates in the electric utility industry. The sample comprises 75 middle managers from
different areas of this organization. This study uses structural equation modeling as the data analysis
method.
Findings – The results indicate that internal and global transparencies determine middle managers’
perceptions of budgeting usefulness, while no relationship was found for repair capacity and flexibility
characteristics. This paper shows that managers, when provided with global and internal transparencies and
independently of their level discretion regarding target revisions or the reallocation of resources, perceive
budgeting systems as being useful for decision-facilitating and decision-influencing roles.
Practical implications – The findings might be relevant for budgeting professionals to review or design
the budgeting system in terms of dribbling potential flaws and increasing its use in the organization.
Originality/value – The study explores the multidimensionality of the enabling-coercive budgeting
design construct. This study provides a theoretical contribution to the literature by showing that budget
alignment, integration, learning and information sharing are relevant such that an organization could
improve the assertiveness using budgeting systems. Besides, this paper provides an opposing view about the
supposed relation between flexible budgeting design and budgeting usefulness. Frequently, some
management directions are offered by the literature and no guarantee is provided in terms of the connection
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between the adoption and the usefulness of those mechanisms. Therefore, the findings shed more light on the
practical developments in budgeting.
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1. Introduction
The few past years have seen the emergence of literature focusing on the consequences of an
enabling versus a coercive design and the use of management accounting practices (Burney,
Radtke, & Widener, 2016; Chapman & Kihn, 2009; Henttu-Aho, 2016). The predominant
logic of this literature is that an enabling control is a “good” thing (Burney et al., 2016), as it
improves managers’ job performance (Wouters & Wilderom, 2008), increases the perceived
success of the system (Chapman & Kihn, 2009) and helps managers to balance objectives of
efficiency and flexibility in their work (Jørgensen & Messner, 2009). Enabling controls are
also expected to foster positive attitudinal outcomes concerning managers (Adler & Borys,
1996; Henttu-Aho, 2016; Souza & Beuren, 2018) and organizational outcomes such as
resilience (Beuren& Santos, 2019).
Adler and Borys (1996) state that the usability of a control mechanism can be determined
by its ability to provide the user with internal transparency, global transparency, repair
capacity and flexibility, which are constituent dimensions of an enabling control. Many
management accounting practices have been studied under the umbrella of the enabling-
coercive framework such as budgeting systems (Henttu-Aho, 2016; Chapman & Kihn, 2009;
Hartmann&Maas, 2011).
Based on the enabling-coercive rationale, we argue that there is still an open debate about
if budgeting systems would also be seen as “usable” by managers. The reason is that a
budgeting system is usually seen as a cybernetic control in the sense that it is used to assess
current outcomes based on preplanned objectives and standards (Malmi & Brown, 2008)
and might be adopted to constrain operational management actions. On the other hand,
there is also evidence that the use of flexible forms of budgeting might be beneficial to firms
in several ways, as they introduce an enabling logic into a practice that is predominantly
seen as coercive (Henttu-Aho, 2016).
Hence, the budgeting system can be seen as enabling or coercive, depending on the design
dimensions discussed in Adler and Borys’s (1996) framework. In particular, are all the four
above-mentioned enabling design dimensions determinants of a manager’s positive attitudes
and perceptions regarding a control mechanism? There is still little evidence about how each
enabling dimension relates to managers’ perceptions of usefulness (Chapman & Kihn, 2009;
Jordan & Messner, 2012). Following Jordan and Messner’s (2012) rationale, internal and
global transparencies might help managers to recognize, while repair and flexibility might
help them to solve, the “incompleteness problem” of accounting information.
Although decentralization might be a feature of an enabling system, managerial control
is better seen as enabling when it “attempts to mobilize local knowledge and experience”
thorough internal and global transparency (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004, p. 296). Previous
literature also shows empirical evidence that managers might see more benefit in rigid and
fixed controls when they are used for performance evaluation (Marginson & Ogden, 2005;
Frow, Marginson, & Ogden, 2010).
These dimensions could influence how managers, especially middle managers, see a
budget system as a useful mechanism for the roles of accounting information, both the
decision-facilitating and decision-influencing roles (van Veen-Dirks, 2010). Middle managers




strategies through budgets (Fauré & Rouleau, 2011). Middle managers might use budgets as
guidance to decision-making and actions or also as for performance evaluation, which,
respectively, characterizes the decision-facilitating and decision-influencing roles (Demski &
Feltham, 1976; van Veen-Dirks, 2010). Both these roles are related to the usefulness of
managerial mechanisms such as budgets.
We argue that the usefulness that middle managers perceive in the budget mechanisms
might be contingent on how the mechanism is designed (Chapman & Kihn, 2009). Based on
this discussion, we propose the following research question:
RQ1. what is the influence of the enabling-coercive design characteristics of a
budgeting system onmiddle managers’ perceived budgeting usefulness?
Our study focuses on the single firm context of a large publicly listed company in Brazil,
which operates in the electric utility industry, hereafter called Energy Corp. There is a lack
of studies that focus on one organizational setting (Henttu-Aho, 2016; Souza & Beuren, 2018)
and the middle management level (Frow et al., 2010; Fauré & Rouleau, 2011). Thus, our
study complements the evidence that has been found at the firm level (Chapman & Kihn,
2009; Beuren & Santos, 2019).
We argue that there are variations in how managers in this organization perceive the
enabling budgeting characteristics and usefulness. This variation might come from:
 how the different responsibility centers that compose the organizational structure of
a large corporation interact with the budgeting system;
 how different organizational areas such as operations, finance and marketing, as
well as managers with different backgrounds, dealing with the budgeting targets
(Kihn, 2011); and
 how these enabling design characteristics might help managers to deal with the
“incompleteness problem” of the information provided by the budgeting system
(Jordan &Messner, 2012).
Therefore, this paper sheds more light on the discussion of budgeting usefulness by
decoupling the design dimensions of the budgeting process based on the enabling-coercive
framework. This topic is relevant, as there is still scarce evidence on how each enabling
dimension is associated with a manager’s attitudinal outcomes (Chapman & Kihn, 2009;
Jordan & Messner, 2012) such as the use of the budgeting process to facilitate and influence
decisions in the business. In addition, we address the claim form prior studies such as
Wouters and Roijmans (2011, p. 712), who note that it is still a challenge to “understand
what accounting means for different people and how it is used outside the finance and
accounting domain” and also the claim to focus on one organizational setting (Kihn, 2011;
Jørgensen &Messner, 2009).
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
The perceived usefulness construct has two facets that are related to the two main roles of
accounting information, which are the decision-facilitating role and the decision-influencing
role (Demski & Feltham, 1976; van Veen-Dirks, 2010). First, the decision-facilitating role is
related to the provision of information to guide managerial decision-making and actions, to
help managers to deal with uncertainties and opportunities (Demski & Feltham, 1976; van
Veen-Dirks, 2010). Second, the decision-influencing role refers to the use of information by
higher-level managers to measure and control subordinates’ actions, which are used to




Previous scholars have investigated the determinants of managers’ perceptions about the
usefulness of several management practices. For instance, the perceived usefulness
construct has been studied in the context of budgeting systems (Magner, Welker, &
Campbell, 1996), which particularly is the focus of this study. We focus on the design
characteristics of budgets that might enhance both roles as mentioned above, treated as
perceived budget usefulness, based on the enabling-coercive framework (Adler & Borys,
1996; Chapman&Kihn, 2009).
The enabling-coercive literature is positioned under the umbrella of bureaucratic and
formal controls and offers a deep understanding of the duality between controls, by
emphasizing organizational efficiency and innovation (Adler & Borys, 1996; Ahrens &
Chapman, 2004). In short, the enabling-coercive framework looks at the duality between two
types of controls, which are called coercive and enabling. The coercive view of controls
involves managers performing specific tasks within which they have limited discretion over
business processes and there is limited transparency. The enabling system perspective uses
the logic of usability, efficiency and flexibility by enhancing users’ experience and
capabilities (Adler & Borys, 1996).
Previous empirical research in the field of management accounting has applied the
enabling-coercive framework as the lens through which to investigate many accounting
practices such as budgeting systems (Henttu-Aho, 2016; Chapman & Kihn, 2009; Hartmann
& Maas, 2011) and Performance Measurement Systems (Englund & Gerdin, 2015; Jordan &
Messner, 2012; Wouters & Roijmans, 2011; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008; Souza & Beuren,
2018; Beuren & Santos, 2019). In the sequence, we develop the hypotheses based on each
dimension of the enabling design, which are repair capacity, internal transparency, global
transparency and flexibility.
2.1 Research hypotheses
According to Adler and Borys (1996), repairs consist of changes in procedures related to new
opportunities, improvements or deviations adjustments. Under the coercive logic, any
deviation is seen as suspicious and procedures serve to inform superiors about whether
subordinates are meeting targets. From the enabling perspective, procedures are designed to
generate quick responses to threats and opportunities and deviations indicate an
opportunity to review and modify inappropriate systems’ patterns (Adler & Borys, 1996).
For instance, repairs in a budgeting systemmight be illustrated:
 by changes in procedures that determine how managers evaluate performance
based on the budgeting system during the current year and
 by changes in the targets previously established in the plan. Henttu-Aho (2016)
suggests that repair capacity relates to the possibility of modifications in budgeted
costs during the year.
Repairs might be considered as a remedy for the accounting information incompleteness
“problem” (Jordan & Messner, 2012; Henttu-Aho, 2016). By solving the incompleteness
problem of the accounting information, budget targets are adjusted to a more realistic base,
which is expected to facilitate managers’ decision-making and help them to deal with
uncertainty (Frow et al., 2010; Henttu-Aho, 2016). Also, a “repaired” target might provide
managers with the direction that they need to develop their managerial tasks and lead their
team under the organizational goals (Kihn, 2011).
Under a coercive logic, top managers would require strict adherence from middle
managers to the targets established in the budget plan, independent of any contingencies




budgeting system can lead to unrealistic budget targets, which can be seen as “incomplete”
targets (Jordan & Messner, 2012). Managers would be reluctant to rely on these unrealistic
budget targets or resources to guide their decisions and to lead their teams (Libby &
Lindsay, 2010). Based on this literature, we hypothesize that:
H1. Repair capacity in the budgeting system positively influences perceived budgeting
usefulness.
Internal transparency refers to procedures that make internal activities visible to users. The
coercive perspective involves the formulation of “lists of duties” with a lack of detailed
information, for example, on the manager’s targets. The enabling view involves the logic where
users have access to information and the key components of the process are visible (Ahrens &
Chapman, 2004). A budgeting system’s internal transparency depends on the level to which
budget variances are estimated in meaningful categories and the effects of these variations on
other processes’ parameters. For these authors, “the key to a successful design of internal
transparency lies in giving layered access to information” (Ahrens& Chapman, 2004, p. 280).
Under the internal transparency enabling logic, budgeting should provide managers with
clear information about their activities, allowing them to understand departmental targets and
the internal functioning of the budget (Henttu-Aho, 2016). By having detailed information
about what drives their departments’ performance, middle managers would realize that the
budgeting system guides their decisions (decision-facilitating role) and helps them to lead their
teams (decision-influencing role). Vandenbosch (1999) argues that control systems that aim to
facilitate improvements and legitimize decisions and that can direct organizational attention –
features of internal transparency – are perceived as being more useful by managers, in terms of
both their utility for managing and the relevant information for decision-making.
Under a coercive logic, managers would not be offered detailed information about their
departments’ targets and the attainment of these targets, but instead would be provided with
a list of duties to perform (Chapman & Kihn, 2009; Adler & Borys, 1996). In this situation,
managers would feel they lack the information they see as necessary to enhance decision-
making. They would not have the possibility to identify problems such as incompleteness in
the targets, which could be addressed or minimized by interactions (communication,
meetings) among managers in the organization (Jordan & Messner, 2012). Therefore, budget
targets would lose their relevance to operationalizing the firm’s strategies and managers
would be deprived of the tools such as layered meaningful variance analysis, required to
guide their decisions andmanage their business areas. Hence, we hypothesize that:
H2. Internal transparency in the budgeting system positively influences perceived
budgeting usefulness.
Global transparency refers to users’ understanding of the entire system. The coercive logic
dictates asymmetric transparency because providing global transparency to subordinates is
considered risky for the organization. Therefore, under the coercive logic, it is necessary to
establish limits to information sharing about corporate processes. According to the enabling
perspective, managers are immersed in diverse information that helps them act proactively.
In this sense, business processes allow managers to understand how their tasks fit within
and contribute to the organization as a whole (Adler & Borys, 1996).
Global transparency in the budgeting system might provide visibility regarding the
iteration among processes and areas and offer a holistic view of the firm that could be used
to draw up scenarios and put forward different priorities (Henttu-Aho, 2016). According to




“available on a strictly ‘need-to-know’ basis.” Also, it involves communicating key targets
hierarchically and laterally amongmanagers.
The budgeting system is usually implemented as an organizational practice that covers
many business departments and interfaces with other management processes such as cost
systems and Balanced Scorecards (Henttu-Aho, 2016). Under an enabling logic, managers
would have a higher amount of information in their hands. Global transparency might
improve the relevance of the information in the budget plan. Besides, providing contextual
information regarding a departmental level need would raise manager awareness about the
opportunities to improve their performance as managers and the performance of the
business (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Henttu-Aho, 2016). Global transparency could help
managers to identify incompleteness in the budgeting accounting information, which would
minimize the adverse effects on their actions (Jordan&Messner, 2012).
On the other hand, under a coercive logic, top managers would establish limits to
organizational information details sharing (Adler & Borys, 1996; Ahrens & Chapman, 2004).
In this situation, managers would lack relevant information about the impact of their
decisions on other areas, causing a detachment between departmental actions and the
attainment of key organizational goals (Henttu-Aho, 2016). This scenario would lead to a
weakening of the decision-facilitating and decision-influencing roles of budgeting systems
in the organization, as the firm’s strategies would not be effectively hierarchically and
laterally communicated among the firm’s levels and areas. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H3. Global transparency in the budgeting system positively influences perceived
budgeting usefulness.
Flexibility determines the level of discretion and autonomy that managers have as users of a
management process. The coercive perspective assumes a more stable logic by defining
detailed steps to be followed by the manager. It leaves no opportunity for manager
discretion such as in budgeting reviews (Adler & Borys, 1996). The enabling logic of
flexibility assumes that deviations are seen as both risks and learning opportunities for
managers and the organization. Flexibility in budgeting systems would be related to the
reallocation of budgeted resources among areas in an organization and the supply of
resources to a specific area.
Henttu-Aho (2016) indicates that flexibility might relate to the use of stretched targets
and revisions to non-compulsory fixed costs that were previously budgeted. Particularly
regarding business controllers’ roles, flexibility in a budgeting system might also relate to
the development of alternate scenarios that can be used to change the course of action of the
organization (Henttu-Aho, 2016).
Flexibility is essentially a design characteristic related to resource reallocation to adapt
the formal system to contingencies that might occur. It is also related to emergent strategies
designed to take advantage of opportunities that may arise. Frow et al. (2010) claimed that
flexible budgeting models (such as “continuous budgeting”) enabled managers to prioritize
andmake adaptations to meet strategic organizational objectives, thus increasing budgeting
utility and usefulness. Flexibility might be related to empowering managers’ roles in the
organization (Frow et al., 2010), in which they are able to reallocate the resources defined in
the budget plan. We argue that this empowerment might also lead to a higher level of
managers’ perceptions of budgeting usefulness (Wouters & Wilderom, 2008; Souza &
Beuren, 2018). There is evidence that a budget with these characteristics can make
“controllers experts in producing and delivering more realistic forward-looking information
in the organization” (Henttu-Aho, 2016, p. 31), which has positive implications for managers’




Under the coercive logic, managers would not be given any degree of discretion over
budget targets and would have to be accountable for the attainment of preplanned targets
without being able to adjust their routes of action. This lack of flexibility in the budgeting
system might put a straitjacket on managers by limiting their range of action plans, which
would consequently create tensions regarding howmanagers deal with “incomplete” targets
(Jordan & Messner, 2012). In this scenario, where the “incompleteness of budgeting targets”
remains unsolved, a budget would lose its usefulness for managers (Jordan &Messner, 2012;
Henttu-Aho, 2016; Frow et al., 2010). Based on the literature mentioned above, we
hypothesize that:
H4. Flexibility in the budgeting system positively influences perceived budgeting
usefulness.
In sum, we argue that managers are more likely to perceive the budgeting system as being
useful (utility and relevant information) when it is designed to provide a sense of (Chapman
&Kihn, 2009; Henttu-Aho, 2016):
 integration between local actions and broader concerns (global transparency);
 guidance or a glass-box (Englund & Gerdin, 2015) for local actions (internal
transparency); and
 support for contingencies emerging at the organizational or environmental level that
may require revisions of targets or norms (repair capacity) and the reallocation of
resources to critical activities (flexibility).
Our theoretical model divides into four main hypotheses, which are presented in Figure 1.
3. Research design
3.1 Research setting
We conducted a survey with middle managers from one large Brazilian firm in which the
budgeting process is one of the most important mechanisms used for managing the
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and capturing the differences in terms of departmental areas or responsibility centers (Nouri
& Parker, 1998; Souza & Beuren, 2018), therefore extending the contributions of prior
studies that have focused onmultiple firms (Van der Stede, Young, & Chen, 2005).
The firm is a publicly listed corporation that trades shares on the Brazilian stock
exchange and in other countries. Energy Corp is controlled by a Brazilian State Federation
and operates in the electric utility industry (generation, transmission, distribution and
trading). The organization has about 8,000 employees and an annual turnover of about 5bn
dollars (2014 reference date). The complexity of the company and its processes are perceived
as a distinct field for investigation. Moreover, Energy Corp is a large company with several
management-level positions and business areas that interface with the budgeting system.
3.2 Sample selection
Our study uses an individual level of analysis, considering many respondents in one
organization (Van der Stede et al., 2005). We focus on middle managers, as they are seen as
mediators of top levels and operational levels to implement the organization’s strategy,
which might happen through budgets (Fauré & Rouleau, 2011). Middle managers are seen
as “actors who combine access to top management with knowledge of operations” (Schmid,
Floyd, & Wooldridge, 2010, p. 143). Prior literature has shown the importance of middle
managers in planning and control practices such as strategic planning and budgeting (Fauré
& Rouleau, 2011; Guggenberger & Rohlfing-Bastian, 2016). We argue that middle managers
might experience and interpret the budgeting system differently in terms of consciousness
and situationally (Kihn, 2011).
These managers are a relevant target population for this study, as they face pressure
from superiors (top management team) and subordinates and they are accountable for
departmental performance concerning budget attainment (Jordan & Messner, 2012). Our
target population was formed by middle managers of the organization, which comprise a
population of approximately 180 managers which was defined in the preliminary interview
with the budgeting manager. Our final sample is composed of 75 middle managers who are
divided into many functional areas, representing a response rate of 42%.
Based on our preliminary interview with the corporate budgeting manager, we consider
those middle managers might vary in regard to their interface with the budgeting system in
terms of the extent they:
 participate in the budgeting planning process;
 use the budgeting information in their activities;
 are accountable for budget performance to executives of the top management team
and have to provide explanations about their performance variations; and
 depend on the attainment of budgeting targets (collective indicators) as the basis for
part of their financial incentives.
3.3 Data collection
First, we presented an ethical protocol for the development of this study to the organization
and obtained its agreement. This protocol provided information about the research scope,
data collection procedures, schedule and analysis.
We followed Dillman’s (2007) recommendations for the survey design and
implementation. First, we applied a pre-test with the help of a controller and three PhD
candidates that investigate management control systems. The changes in the questionnaire




applied a pilot test during the interviews that we conducted with nine middle managers in
the organization, including the corporate budgeting manager. In this pilot test, no
adaptation due to translation or interpretation was needed, so we considered the nine
responses in our sample. We first sent a cover letter explaining the purpose of the research
and inviting the managers to participate and then we sent two follow-up letters as
reminders.
3.4 Measurement of variables
We used instruments that have been previously validated by empirical research. The
measurement of enabling design characteristics of budgeting is based on 14 questions from
Chapman and Kihn (2009), featuring two items for repair capacity (RC), four items for internal
transparency (IT), six items for global transparency (GT) and two items for flexibility (FL).
We operationalized perceived budgeting usefulness based on two constructs. First, the
measurement of perceived budget utility relies on the scale developed by Swieringa and
Moncur (1975). Second, the budget information relevance construct is derived from the job-
relevant information proposed by Kren (1992). Hence, we used two items for budget utility
and three for budget information relevance that were also validated by Magner et al. (1996).
As these constructs did not present discriminant validity, we treated the five items as one
construct, called perceived budgeting usefulness (PBU). All the instruments are based on a
five-point Likert scale. The instruments are available from the authors upon request.
We conducted Harman’s single factor test to address concerns about common method
bias (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). The first factor accounts for 46.8% and four
principal components were extracted with eigenvalues higher than one. Therefore, even
though we cannot say that there is no common method variance in the model, the Harman
test shows that it should not be of great concern to the results.
As control variables, we included years in the organization (Tenure), which is related to
the managers’ experience and attitudes in the firm. Additionally, we controlled for the
managers’ main functional areas (Department), which is measured as a formative latent
variable based on four dummies being Generation and Transmission Departments,
Distribution and Trading Departments, Finance Departments and Corporate Management
Departments – and others (n = 11) as the category of reference.
3.5 Data analysis method
We applied the multivariate technique of structural equation modeling based on partial least
squares (PLS-SEM) to test the model proposed in the research and discuss the research
hypotheses.We used SmartPLS 3.0 for the PLS-SEM analyzes (Ringle,Wende, & Becker, 2015).
PLS-SEM maximizes the explained variance of the endogenous variables, as it is done in
multiple regression. Still, it can also estimate the measurement and structural models
(relationships between latent variables) in the same procedure (Hair, Black, Babin,
Anderson, & Tatham, 2009; Nitzl, 2016). Missing values were addressed through mean
replacement. This procedure is valid because the small number of missing responses were
not concentrated in a specific respondent or variable.
The sample of 75 respondents is sufficient to detect a medium effect size (f2 = 0.17) at the 5%
significance level. We conducted the sensitivity analysis using the GPower 3VR software
based on the following parameters (Nitzl, 2016) of statistical power equal to 0.8 (type II error






Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of our respondents. Based on the characterization,
we argue that the respondents have a solid academic education, hold key positions and have
a significant amount of experience in the company, thus providing a sample that is diverse





Sample characteristics n (%)
Panel A. Tenure in the organization
Between 6 and 10 years 4 5
Between 11 and 20 years 5 7
Between 21 and 30 years 59 79
More than 31 years 5 7
Missing 2 3
Panel B. Tenure as a manager in the current department
Between 1 and 2 years 21 28
Between 3 and 5 years 32 43
Between 6 and 10 years 13 17
Between 11 and 20 years 3 4
More than 21 years 4 5
Missing 2 3
Panel C. Age
Between 30 and 40 years old 10 13
Between 41 and 50 years old 37 49
Between 51 and 60 years old 26 35
Missing 2 3
Panel D. Functional area
Distribution and trading 26 35
Generation and transmission 15 20




Panel E. Educational background
Undergraduate 5 7
Graduate (as MBA) 55 73
Graduate (Master degree) 13 17
PhD 2 3






Notes: Generation, transmission, distribution and trading are operational areas. Finance and corporate
management are considered as some of the corporate areas of energy corp. The other areas are legal,
institutional relations and communication. No respondent is less than 30 years old and no respondent has




4.2 Measurement model assessment
We first validated the measurement model by looking at the convergent validity, which is
based on the outer loadings and average variance extracted (AVE) and the reliability,
considering the composite reliability (CR) parameter. In Table 2, we present the CR and AVE
results, which meet the validation criteria from Hair, Hult, Ringle, and Sarstedt (2013), since
they are respectively higher than 0.7 and 0.5.
We analyzed discriminant validity using cross-loadings (level indicators) and the
Fornell-Larcker criterion, which requires the square roots of the AVE to be higher than
the correlations between the latent variables (Hair et al., 2013). The results of the
discriminant validity at the latent variable level are shown in Table 2 (values on the
diagonal are higher than the off-diagonal values). The Heterotrait-Monotrait criterion
also indicates discriminant validity (values lower than 0.85). The correlation coefficients
show that the enabling characteristics of the budgeting mechanism are positively
associated with each other, except for flexibility. Moreover, the correlations between both
global and internal transparencies and perceived budgeting usefulness are strong and
statistically significant at 5%.
4.3 Structural model analyzes
Once the validation of the measurement model was completed, we analyzed the structural
model following four steps. First, the multicollinearity among the constructs was assessed
using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), whose measures should be lower than five.
Second, the path coefficients were determined based on the size and statistical significance
of the coefficients. To run these results, we applied the bootstrapping procedure with 5,000
repetitions and a two-tailed test (Hair et al., 2013). Third, we used the coefficient of
determination or R2, which indicates the percentage of a dependent variable’s variance that
is explained by the independent variables. Fourth, we used the effect size coefficient (f2),
which indicates the impact of an independent variable on the dependent variable, based on
the omitted variable procedure (Hair et al., 2013). To evaluate these parameters, we used the
classification suggested by Cohen (1988), divided into small effect (f2 = 0.02), medium effect




Latent variables 1 2 3 4 5
1 - Repair capacity 0.829
2 - Internal transparency 0.168 0.833
3 - Global transparency 0.189 0.729 0.783
4 - Flexibility 0.392 0.344 0.509 0.750
5 - Perceived budgeting usefulness 0.273 0.625 0.692 0.479 0.887
Controls
6 - Department 0.006 0.304 0.398 0.201 0.219
7 - Tenure 0.063 0.211 0.094 0.134 0.040
AVE 0.687 0.694 0.613 0.562 0.786
Composite reliability 0.813 0.901 0.904 0.706 0.948
Notes: Correlations greater than or equal to j 0.227 j are significant at 5% and correlations greater than or
equal to j 0.296 j are significant at 1%. The values on the diagonal are the square roots of the average
variances extracted; because these values are higher than the correlations between the latent variables




In Table 3, we present the results for the structural equation model. We analyzed the effect
of the independent variables on the dependent variable, controlling for the manager’s tenure
in the firm and functional areas. Our results show that the enabling characteristics of
budgeting explain 51.3% of the variance in perceived budgeting usefulness, which is
considered a high R2 for social sciences (Cohen, 1988). As Table 3 shows, our control
variables such as middle managers functional areas and tenure are not significantly related
to perceived budgeting usefulness contradicting Kihn’s (2011) rationale about consciousness
and situationally, which enhances our argument that it is the design of the budgeting
system that might influence PBU.
4.4 Test of hypothesis
4.4.1 Repair capacity. We found a non-significant association between repair capacity and
perceived budgeting usefulness (H1). Prior literature on the enabling-coercive framework
suggests that the understanding of repair capacity is controversial (Jordan & Messner, 2012;
Henttu-Aho, 2016). Concerning this, previous empirical research has demonstrated that a high
level of discretion is not related to perceived budgeting usefulness because, in a scenario in
which the budget system is used for managers’ performance evaluations, managers may
benefit more from a stable orientation and fixed reference points, despite flexible targets
(Marginson&Ogden, 2005; Englund&Gerdin, 2015), whichmight be the case of Energy Corp.
4.4.2 Internal transparency. We confirmed hypothesis H2 as being statistically
significant, with a 5% significance level. Our results support a positive influence of internal
transparency on perceived budgeting usefulness (b = 0.289, f2=0.083, p = 0.044). This
reinforces the understanding that internal transparency in a budgeting system provides
managers with clear and detailed information about their performance expectations and
variations (Henttu-Aho, 2016), which leads to a higher level of perceived budgeting
usefulness. Having a structure and orientation about performance targets is usually seen as
valuable by middle managers (Marginson & Ogden, 2005). Finally, internal transparency
might also be related to learning and accountability (Henttu-Aho, 2016; Frow et al., 2010;
Beuren & Santos, 2019), which encourage managers to be motivated and lead their teams
based on budget targets.
4.4.3 Global transparency. Our results support a significant positive influence of global
transparency on perceived budgeting usefulness (H3). They indicate that the higher the
global transparency, the higher the perceived budgeting usefulness (b = 0.421, f2=0.144,
p= 0.010). Therefore, by widening the scope and developing the integration between areas
concerning budget targets, top managers could encourage middle managers to use
budgeting information to guide their actions in the firm (Henttu-Aho, 2016).
Global transparency could assist in the deployment of a firm’s strategies through budget





Structural model relationships H b p-value R2adj b p-value f2 R2adj VIF
Department! PBU 0.233 0.381 0.040 0.069 0.487 0.009 0.513 1.201
Tenure! PBU 0.092 0.550 0.088 0.342 0.016 1.072
Repair capacity! PBU H1 0.090 0.466 0.015 1.196
Internal transparency! PBU H2 0.289 0.044 0.083 2.259
Global transparency! PBU H3 0.421 0.010 0.144 2.756




responsibilities toward the firm and in leading their teams (Henttu-Aho, 2016; Beuren &
Santos, 2019). When they have interactive and contextual information, managers perceive
that the budgeting system provides themwith relevant information.
4.4.4 Flexibility. Finally, contradicting previous literature (Frow et al., 2010; Jordan &
Messner, 2012), we found a non-significant association between flexibility and perceived
budgeting usefulness. Therefore, a more flexible design of the budget system, related, for
example, to the reallocation of budgeted resources among the range of a firm’s priorities,
may be restricted to the top management team. However, they do not perceive that the level
of autonomy in terms of managing resources influences their usefulness perceptions of this
management practice (Marginson& Ogden, 2005).
5. Discussion
Our results provide empirical evidence that internal and global transparency enabling
design characteristics are positively associated with budgeting usefulness, specifically with
budget utility and budget information relevance. One of the main advantages of the
budgeting system is that it creates a sense of the firm’s direction in terms of deploying goals
and operationalizing strategies from strategic planning. The budgeting system also makes
managers’ roles and responsibilities at a departmental level transparent, as well as showing
the cause-effect of activities on the firm’s performance, which are determinants of managers’
perceptions of usefulness (Chapman&Kihn, 2009).
In contrast, our results do not support a statistically significant influence of either repair
capacity or flexibility on PBU. Despite budgeting systems offer little opportunity for
manager discretion, we would expect a significant association between those dimensions
and perceived budgeting usefulness, as is currently advocated by criticisms of budgeting
(Libby & Lindsay, 2010). Therefore, the question that remains unanswered is why repair
capacity and flexibility do not influence PBU. This finding might be discussed in terms of
different angles.
First, we suppose that the organization studied and its business units do not face a
turbulent and unpredictable environment, given it operates in the energy utility industry
(regulated market). Because of that, either the organizations do not implement a flexible
design or managers do not perceive the benefits of a flexible budget design to the decision-
making process (Marginson &Ogden, 2005).
Another debate on an organizational level that could explain these nonsignificant results
is the discussion of multiple roles that budgets play in the organization (Hansen & Van der
Stede, 2004; Mucci, Frezatti, & Dieng, 2016; Henri, Massicotte, & Arbour, 2019). Particularly,
managers might benefit from repair capacity and flexibility to solve the incompleteness
problem of accounting information (Jordan &Messner, 2012) when the budget is expected to
serve the forecasting role but not for the performance evaluation role (Haka and Krishnan,
2005; Henri et al., 2019). In other words, constant revisions create a bias to a manager’s
performance evaluation expectations and might reduce managers’ commitment to those
goals (Haka and Krishnan, 2005; Marginson & Ogden, 2005), while on the other hand, it
might benefit PBU in terms of forecasting.
This result is also aligned with prior empirical findings that repair capacity and
flexibility design characteristics, despite mitigating accounting information incompleteness
(Jordan & Messner, 2012) and improving effectiveness (Marginson & Ogden, 2005; Englund
& Gerdin, 2015), may not increase perceptions of budget usefulness. A budget system might
also be used to provide certainty and direction, which is required by managers in their




has also suggested that managers tend to appreciate a higher level of detail and tightness in
management control mechanisms than flexible systems (Marginson &Ogden, 2005).
6. Final remarks
This article investigates the association between budget enabling design characteristics and
the budget usefulness perceived by middle managers from all business areas in a large
corporation in Brazil that operates in the electric utility industry. Based on the enabling-
coercive rationale, this study provides empirical evidence about the budgeting system’s
“usability,”which is still an open debate in the literature (Libby & Lindsay, 2010).
Our findings contribute to the literature on budgeting systems by showing evidence
about the design characteristics that drive the manager’s perceptions of budget usefulness
(internal and global transparency). The dimensions of transparency seem to mobilize
operational and strategic knowledge in the firm, which enhances budgeting usefulness.
Therefore, we provide a contribution to the literature by showing that budget alignment,
integration, learning and information sharing are relevant such that an organization could
improve the assertiveness using budgeting systems.
The nonsignificant relations found in the analyzes, particularly related to H1 and H4,
provide an opposing view about the supposed relation between flexible budgeting design
and budgeting usefulness. This finding is interesting, as researchers frequently propose that
“contemporary” management mechanisms are used by organizations (such as flexible
budget systems). However, there is still little evidence about the connection between the
adoption and the usefulness of those mechanisms in different organizational contexts.
Hence, this study sheds more light on the controversial debate between budgeting
usefulness’ determinants and budget criticisms which imperative usually rely on flexible
forms of budgeting use (Frow et al., 2010). In addition, we suggest that when studying a
corporate and multilevel mechanism such as budget systems, researchers should be aware
of the multidimensionality of the practice and the organization’s context (Sponem &
Lambert, 2016) but also of the respondents’ characteristics (Kihn, 2011).
Our findings need to be analyzed by taking into account the organizational setting of this
study. Energy Corp operates in a more stable and regulated market, which might explain
why flexibility and repair capacity may not be associated with budget usefulness compared
to other industries that face a more uncertain context (Marginson & Ogden, 2005). Besides,
we studied a large and complex business that applies formalized processes that middle
managers have to follow and may not offer an opportunity to middle managers for
discretion and target changes. Particularly in this context, transparency (both global and
internal) may be viewed as more relevant to managers than their opportunity for discretion
with respect to a budgeting system. This view is aligned with Ahrens and Chapman (2004),
which argues that decentralization might not be the main feature of an enabling system, this
instead of being the intensity with which the system mobilizes local knowledge and
experience by providing internal and global transparency to its users.
Our study also advances prior literature on the enabling-coercive framework (Adler &
Borys, 1996) by showing that enabling-coercive design is a multidimensional construct and
that each different dimension might have an effect on a manager’s attitudes and behaviors.
Prior empirical studies have focused on enabling-coercive design-construct as a determinant
of manager’s attitudes and organizational outcomes (Beuren & Santos, 2019). Nevertheless,
few studies have discussed each of the four dimensions independently (Chapman & Kihn,
2009). Particularly, the enabling-coercive framework might help researchers to look at
different perspectives of a budget design, giving a sense about budget alignment and




As practical implications, this paper might be relevant for budgeting professionals to
design or redesign the budgeting system, focusing on the determinants of middle manager’s
usefulness perceptions, mainly providing the budgeting system higher levels of internal and
global transparencies. Then, in this sense, they could dribble potential flaws in the
budgeting process and increase its use in the organization.
Our results should be interpreted in light of some limitations. First, we must be aware of
the limitations that are intrinsic to the survey method design such as the use of perceptual
measures, an unbalanced number of measures for each latent variable, common method bias
and sampling, among other concerns. To address these issues, we applied validated
instruments, which were evaluated in terms of composite reliability, internal and
discriminant validity. We also developed a survey in only one organization and
implemented statistical tests (such as the Harman test) for common method bias (Podsakoff
et al., 2012). We focused on an organizational context in which each manager is responsible
for one or many parts of the budgeting process. Therefore, their perceptions could be
influenced by their role in the budget system (Kihn, 2011; Chapman & Kihn, 2009), which
represents a particular contribution of this study to the existing literature on the enabling
use of budget systems.
Based on these limitations, we raise some questions that could be addressed by future
investigations. We suggest further research of the enabling-coercive framework (Adler &
Borys, 1996), both in the budget system and in other management accounting mechanisms
(Henttu-Aho, 2016). Another relevant point to consider when interpreting the results of this
research is that budgeting design and use might be influenced by many other aspects such as
dimensions, purposes and organizational contingencies. Finally, there are opportunities to
study how managers from various areas of the company who interface with the budgeting
process interpret this process and its targets (Wouters & Roijmans, 2011; Kihn, 2011).
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